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Abstract
We study an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which an Li.d.
demand shock occurs in each period. Each firm receives a private sig-
nal about the demand shock at the beginning of each period. At the
end of each period, information about both the underlying demand
shock and the rivals’ prices becomes public, A firm’s pricing schedule
can be either a sorting scheme, in which its price depends on its pri-
vate signal, or a price-rigidity scheme, in which the firm charges the
same price regardless of its private signal. We consider the optimal
symmetric perfect public equilibrium (SPPE). The optimal SPPE con-
sists of a profile of price-rigidity schemes if the accuracy of the private
signals is low. Moreover, the lower the variance of the demand shock,
the more likely that a price-rigidity scheme is optimal. These results
contribute to our understanding of which industries, and under what
conditions, should exhibit rigid prices.
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Although price rigidity is frequently-observed evidence in many oligopolistic
industries, it is still puzzling why collusive firms axe sometimes reluctant to
change price if demand is fluctuating, We explore a repeated-game framework
to demonstrate that firms in tacit collusion optimally adopt rigid-pricing in
the presence of demand fluctuation. We focus on imperfect, private infor-
mation about the underlying demand state. Specifically, we consider the
following questions: How does information asymmetry among firms limit
colluding firms’ ability to respond to demand shocks? Under what condi-
tion does price rigidity arise as an equilibrium phenomenon in a collusive
industry?
Our main result is that, if the accuracy of private demand predictability
is low, the optimal collusion within a class of symmetric $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\backslash \dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{h}.\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{a}$exhibits
repetition of pooling pricing, i.e., price rigidity.
2 Model
We consider infinitely-repeated price competition by two firms. Time line in
a stage game is as follows.









The products are homogeneous so that a firm that charges the lowest price
wins the whole market. We assume that there are two demand states $\{H, L\}$
in each stage, whose distribution is i.i.d., i.e., $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(H)$ $=\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(L)=.5$ . Let
$D^{H}(p)>D^{L}(p)$ denote the demand functions for each state. We normalize
each firm’s marginal cost is zero. This implies that the stage game Nash
equilibrium is $p=0$ regardless of the realized state. Let $s_{i}\in\{h, \ell\}$ denote
the private signal each firm receive. This signal is conditionally independent
across firms, and $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(h|H)=\lambda$ , $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(\ell|H)$ $=1-\lambda$ , $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(\ell|L)=\lambda$ , $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}(h|L)=$
$1-\lambda$ , where $\lambda\in[.5,1]$ (accuracy). Signals have no information if A is .5,
and have perfect info if A is 1. It is important that collusion is tacit, so
that communication is absent, Each firm’s stage game strategy thus takes a
mapping from signals to prices, i.e., $p_{\dot{\mathrm{t}}}(s_{i})$ . This is either pooling, in whic
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the same price is charged regardless of signals, or sorting, Each firm’s payoff
is the discounted sum of stage-game profits, with a discount factor $\delta<1$ .
3 Symmetric Perfect Public Equilibrium
Our solution concept, SPPE, is defined by a strategy profile satisfying the
following two conditions.
Perfect Public Equilibrium: Each firm adopts a sequentially ratio-
nal strategy for which the stage game pricing schedule at each point depen $ds$
only on what has been publicly observed. Although private information is
present within each stage, firms use only public information to coordinate
their pricing schedule before they receive info at the beginning of the period.
Symmetry: At each point, stage game pricing schedules do not depend
on identity of the firm. Symmetry implies that, if firms impose punishments
on a potential deviate, all firms suffer.
4 Optimal Collusion
We suppose that collusive firms choose an optimal SPPE. The next argument
shows that an optimal SPPE value is attainable by the following bang-bang
equilibrium
For an optimal SPPE (existence can be shown), firms use some $p(s)$ at the
initial stage. By optimality of the equilibrium, the continuation payoff from
the next stage is a convex combination of the optimal SPPE payoff and the
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minmax payoff, 0, (by $p=0$ forever). Using public randomization $\alpha(*, *_{7}*)$ ,
the above bang-bang equilibrium can achieve the same SPPE payoff.
To characterize an optimal SPPE, it is convenient to category incentive
constraints into the following two parts.
Incentive Constraints I $(\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}-\mathrm{s}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}):$ firm have no incentive to
charge $p$ other than $p(h)$ or $p(\ell)$ . This deviation is immediately detected, so
that the harshest punishment ($p$ $=0$ forever) deters it for a high discount
factor.
Incentive Constraints II (on-schedule): after receiving a private sig-
$nd$, each firm has no incentive to charge price that is assigned for a different
signal. This deviation is relevant only if firms adopt a sorting pricing sched-
ule.
5 Results
Is $p(s)$ for an optimal (bang-bang) SPPE pooling or sorting? If pooling, no
future punishment is imposed unless a firm commits off-schedule deviation.
In such equilibrium, firms therefore charge the same price over time on the
equilibrium path.
Proposition 1 Repetition of pooling pricing, i.e., price rigidity, arises in an
optimal SPPE, if private signd accuracy is low.
Intuition: The benefit of sorting pricing is to reap informational gain
contained in signals, This gain is increasing as signal accuracy improves.
Private, imperfect signals cause coordination costs of sorting: to deter on-
schedule deviations, price distortion or future price war must be built in.
These costs are decreasing in accuracy since the statistical test power of
public outcomes improves as accuracy is enhanced. If signal accuracy is low,
informational gain $<$ coordination costs, and pooling is therefore better.
Other results: We derive price war implications when rigid-pricing is
not optimal, negative relationship between price rigidity and variance of de
mand fluctuation, and negative relationship between rigidity and concentra-
tion, within oligopolistic regime
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6 Related Literature
Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) demonstrate optimal tacit collusion
may exhibit price rigidity in the presence of i.i.d. private cost shocks. Their
independent-private-value (IPV) setting is qualitatively different from ours in
which shocks commonly affect all firms’ profits and information is correlated.
Other related works are listed in the references.
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